To this, two observations can be added. First, Wallinga's article shows the dynamics between sources of case law, which is essentially the nature of the Corpus Iuris Civilis, and general concepts of law. The desire to merge the two can be seen as the major impetus for a systematic legal method. Solving the difficulty of remaining true to the authoritative texts, while at the same time constructing general legal principles, has stimulated methodological creativity from the scholastic period until now. Secondly, the historical relationship between academia and legal practice merits attention. Currently, the close relationship between legal scholarship and legal practice is regarded suspiciously. The fact that legal methods in scholarship have largely been the same as those in, primarily, judicial practice is one reason why legal scholarship is not regarded as equal, academically, to other disciplines. Looking back to the Middle Ages, we can see that these methods actually originate in university teaching. The development of legal interpretation and argumentation started with the study of Roman texts. These academic achievements turned out to have practical relevance, although not all scholarly approaches were well received: humanism's historical and critical approach was an unwelcome challenge to textual authority.
Whereas Wallinga finds his point of departure in the historical practice of legal scholarship, Carel Smith in his article explores the philosophical basis of legal method. His main claim is that hermeneutics can be regarded as the paradigm, in Kuhn's sense, of legal scholarship. Hermeneutics is not itself a methodology for lawyers, but an account of the conditions for the understanding of law. Both legal doctrine and, more abstractly, legal theory are premised on the philosophical idea that understanding of law requires taking the internal, participant's point of view. Although the routes towards acknowledgement of this idea in legal theory are very different, Smith shows that the work of the European philosophers Gadamer and Wittgenstein can serve to explain the common underlying theory. The constraints for legal interpretation and research are social, bound up with institutions and interpretive communities.
These historical and philosophical reflections on legal scholarship and method yield an optimistic, albeit tentative, conclusion about the possibility of constructing a common European legal method. As Smith argues, the paradigm for legal theory is shared by Anglo-American and continental European theorists, which provides a basis on which to build a European legal method. However, this paradigm also encompasses the idea that culture is an important determinant of legal interpretation. If culture matters so much in law, the diversity in legal cultures may also influence, and interfere with, the development of a common method. Studying methodology in the context of legal cultures and the concrete possibilities for common ground would therefore be an interesting next step, building on the general work presented here.
